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APPORTIONMENT STANDARDS AND JUDICIAL POWER
Robert G. Dixon, Jr.*
Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well
developed and familiar. -Justice Brennan, Opinion of the
Court, Baker v. Carr.
The traditional test under the Equal Protection Clause has been
whether a State has made an "invidious discrimination." -Jus-
tice Douglas, concurring, Baker v. Carr.
I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he
said, "The more you explain it, the more I don't understand
it." -Justice Jackson, dissenting, SEC v. Chenery, Corp.
A. INTRODUCTION
Historians delight in telling us that there is nothing new under the sun;
only new currents in old tides of human events., But Baker v. Carr' was a
radical departure from established patterns of judicial review, as we have known
them from 1803 to 1962. Baker represents neither the familiar pattern of ju-
dicial review and occasional negation of particular governmental policies,'
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School and Graduate School of
Public Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges the aid of the Rockport Fund of George Washington
University Law School and of William T. Pierson, Jr., and Sam Crutchfield, Jr., student
assistants, in the preparation of this paper and the accompanying chart.
1 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2 E.g., invalidation of the division of the West into free states and slave states by the
Missouri Compromise, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856); the invalidation of
numerous state laws regulating business and employment in the heyday of substantive due
process, see McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REv. 34; and the invalidation of numerous New Deal measures in
the 1930's by a restrictive reading of congressional powers generally, the most famous being
Schechter 'Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (National Industrial Recovery
Act), and United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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nor the newer pattern in desegregation cases of imposition of duties to act,
rather than duties to desist.' Both of these patterns have this much in com-
mon: they leave essentially intact the distribution and possession of political
power.4 By contrast, Baker is an invitation to courts to sit in judgment on the
structure of political power; even to effect a judicial transfer of political power.
Novel as this is, in the factual setting of the Tennessee legislature as pre-
sented to the Court in Baker, the decision can be rationalized, under a principle
of democratic necessity, as a high political-judicial act - really, a constitutive
act. To inversely paraphrase Lincoln's famous question, are all the laws to be
enforced save one, and that the basic rule of democratic operation? A substantial
numerical majority had effective voice in neither house in Tennessee. All other
modes of modifying the legislature had proven futile. In such a situation some
judicial participation in the politics of the people may be a precondition to
there being any effective politics.' But the course of events in some lower
courts since then, in states with factual settings quite dissimilar from Tennessee,
has raised large questions concerning the permissible scope of judicial recon-
struction of political majoritarianism.6
My theses may be simply stated. First, in the state legislative apportion-
3 Some of the desegregation cases set a standard of constitutional validity so at variance
with existing practice, particularly in regard to schools, as to require major adjustments in
government finances, programs, and administration in order to achieve compliance. See Hall v.
School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), 287 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1961), aff'd per
curiam 368 U.S. 515 (1962); Jeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1962); Wheller v.
Board of Educ., 309 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1962); Allen v. County School Bd., 207 F. Supp.
349 (1962); Taylor v. Bd. of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), 195 F. Supp. 231
(S.D.N.Y 1961), 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961). See 1961
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, EDUCATION (Book 2), chs. 2-5; U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A. - PUBLIC SCHOOLS SOUTHERN STATES (1962); U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A.- PUBLIC SCHOOLS CITIES IN THE NORTH
AND WEST (1962).
For a detailed discussion of continuing de facto segregation and resulting legal questions
in areas officially desegregated since Brown v. Board of Education (or areas never officially
desegregated) see Sedler, School Segregation in the North and West: Legal Aspects, 7 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 228 (1963). See also Miller, An Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law?, 30
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 399 (1962).
4 The Negro voting cases may become an exception to this statement, but only a partial
exception, because the effect is slight as yet, and the problem is regional. See generally 1961
U. S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, VOTING (Book 1).
5 Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 329, 347 (1962).
6 Within a year after the Baker decision federal or state courts in 19 states had held
apportionments of one or both houses invalid, and in 15 states some actual reapportionment
had occurred. 21 CONG. QUART. WEEKLY REP. 424-31 (1963). The literature has not lagged
far behind. Discussions highlighting the conceptual difficulties in representation theory and
the political problems and pitfalls inherent in apportionment litigation include the following:
DEGRAZIA, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1963); Dixon, supra note
5; Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 252;
Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of Baker
v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1962); Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of
Judicial Intervention and Its Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 673
(1962); Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government: The Meaning
of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 711 (1963). See also Symposium on Baker v. Carr,
72 YALE L. J. 7 (1962) (Contributors: Bickel, Black, Emerson, Goldberg, O'Brien, Pollak,
Schattschneider, Sindler).
For a more optimistic view of equal protection and one man-one vote see McKay,
Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L.
REV. 645 (1963). See also Merrill, Blazes for a Trail Through the Thicket of Reapportion-
ment, 16 OKLA. L. REV. 59 (1963); Hanson, Courts in the Thicket: The Problem of Judicial
Standards in Apportionment Cases, 12 AM. U. L. REV. 51 (1963).
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ment field the basic question is not whether a plaintiff should seek direct rather
than indirect judicial relief - terms which are themselves not free from un-
certainty - but whether, in a given case the court, and especially the federal
court, should grant any relief. The Supreme Court in Baker brought forth a
roaring mouse of justiciability. Some lower courts, responsively, have jumped
into quick, even extreme, action.' But as Justice Stewart aptly pointed out,8
the Baker decision left a little mountain of uncertainty about the judicial role
regarding political philosophies and political practices of representation in an
evolving, dynamically democratic public order.
Second, the large questions are the ones concerning possible federal constitu-
tional standards of fairness in apportionment and districting of multimembered
legislative bodies. These questions are complicated further by our heritage of
bicameralism.9 The Supreme Court, apart from the possibly pregnant silences
in the Baker decision itself, and the remand in the Michigan case,1" has with-
held enlightenment. The recently decided Georgia county unit case, Gray v.
Sanders," involved the quite different issue of election of state-wide officers
from a single constituency - the entire state. In 1963 it would be most diffi-
cult to rationalize any other standard for a single constituency election than
the one man-one vote principle. But as Justice Douglas for the Court inferred,
and as Justices Stewart and Clark expressly stated in their concurrence, Gray
v. Sanders is not a representation case.
Third, the political thicket has become no less political because the courts
have entered. Encompassing all philosophies of representative government, ra-
tionalizations for bicameralism, particular apportionment and gerrymandering
plans and practices - encompassing and informing them all - is the ever-
flowing lifeblood we call politics. Briefs may ignore this factor, court opinions
may ignore it, even many commentators may minimize it, but apportionment
is politics, and in politics no one is neutral. The Michigan Supreme Court's
difficulty, despite nonpartisan election, in juxtaposing political feelings with
judicial temperament, as Dean Neal has observed, is a major example but
hardly unique. " Courts are now handling apportionment and districting cases
7 See notes 126-37 infra and accompanying text.
8 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 265 (1962) (concurring opinion).
9 For a brief post-Baker comment see Hagan, The Bicameral Principle in State Legisla-
tures, 11 J. OF PUB. LAw 310 (1962).
10 Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
11 372 U.S. 368 (1963). For a very unusual interpretation of this county unit case,
suggesting that it created the guideline of "one person, one vote" for apportionment of the
lower house of state legislatures, and postponed this question regarding state senates, see
column of Arthur Krock, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1963, p. 46, col. 4. In the Georgia county
unit case Justice Douglas for the Court did make this comment, when comparing it to Baker:
"Nor does it [county unit case] present the question, inherent in the bicameral form of our
Federal Government, whether a State may have one house chosen without regard to population."
372 U.S. at 376. But he immediately preceded this comment by stressing the point that the
case did not involve state policy regarding choice of "representatives," and subsequently added
this statement: "Nor does the question here have anything to do with the composition of
the state or federal legislature. And we intimate no opinion on the constitutional phases of
that problem beyond what we said in Baker v. Carr .. ." Id. at 378.
12 See the opinions in full, Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960), Scholle
v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), and comment on Michigan and Oklahoma
in Neal, supra note 6, at 305 n.155.
Professor Israel has made this comment with reference to the Michigan case: "The
unfortunate result may be direct judicial entry into the arena of political debate, as was the
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
not because they present no political questions, but despite the fact that they
do present political questions. Both standards and remedies, direct or indirect,
must be conditioned by this elemental fact.
Fourth, standards to govern the merits of a claim and remedies to effect
relief are inextricably intertwined. We need not swallow all of positivist juris-
prudence to agree with Bentham 3 and Austin,1" and Professor Hohfeld, 5 on
this point. Benthamites stress the weakness of right, or law, absent adequate
sanctions, citing international "law" as an example. The reverse is likewise true.
Inexactness of right or standard necessarily produces uncertainty as to remedy.
Apportionment is one of those fields where it is easier to identify
unfair or unequal methods than to articulate a fair method. Conceptually, much
more is involved here than just opposite sides of one coin. It is instructive to
draw an analogy to the Federal Trade Commission and the ill-fated National
Recovery Administration. The FTC polices "unfair methods of competition"
and the courts have had no difficulty sustaining delegation of power phrased
in these terms." But the NIRA's mission to prepare "codes of fair competi-
tion" was nullified 9-0." Justice Cardozo commented that this was "delega-
tion running riot."1 8 The crucial, and proper, distinction is that the FTC pro-
ceeds retrospectively, case by case, to lop off competitive excesses after a care-
ful fact-finding process. By contrast, the NIRA's attempted mission was to de-
fine, prospectively, those practices deemed "fair," and to order them into
existence. The scope of discretion, the breadth of policy making, and the re-
sulting residuum of private choice, is vastly different when government switches
from the negative to the affirmative approach. It comes close to being the dif-
ference between a regulated and a planned society. 9 Similarly, it is one thing
to review apportionments and nullify grossly "unreasonable" ones, although
the reasons may be as elusive as the basis for Lochner v. New York" and other
substantive due process decisions. It is quite different to specify detailed guide-
liness for the legislature to follow in devising a "fair" apportionment-districting
plan, or by direct judicial action to devise and promulgate a new apportion-
ment pattern itself.
Let me now unravel some of these thoughts and put some flesh on the
bones.
case in Scholle. There the various opinions were sprinkled with injudicious comments directed
at political opponents, including a scarcely-veiled warning that the majority opinion might
go by the wayside if the 'wrong' judges were chosen in the upcoming election." Israel, supra
note 6, at 146.
13 BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (1776).
14 AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (1832).
15 Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913), 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
16 FTC v. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304 (1934); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643
(1931); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920). Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 313 U.S. 80 (1943),
332 U.S. 194 (1947). For a general discussion see 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
ch. 2 (1958); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 358
(1947).
17 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
18 Id. at 553.
19 See RoSTOW, PLANNING FOR FREEDOM (1959).
20 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34.
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B. SOME UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS CONCERNING STANDING, JUSTICIABILITY,
AND FEDERAL ABSTENTION
Despite Baker v. Carr's explicit focus on jurisdiction, standing to sue, and
justiciability, some lingering problems remain in this area, except for jurisdic-
tion. By its holding, Baker did terminate jurisdictional questions concerning state
legislative apportionment suits.2 By its dictum2 2 it terminated any doubts de-
rived from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Colegrove v Green2" concerning
jurisdiction over congressional districting suits.'
Since Baker, some questions have been raised in the lower courts concern-
ing standing to sue, and necessary and proper parties, but the issues have not
been insurmountable. The federal district court in Wisconsin held that the state,
in its sovereign capacity, could not be an apportionment plaintiff.25 But private
plaintiffs were allowed to intervene, thus enabling the state to acquire parens
patriae status.26 The state Attorney General continued to dominate the plain-
tiffs' side of the case both as state representative and as counsel for the private
plaintiffs." The defendant was the Secretary of State. The federal district court
in Nebraska denied standing to the League of Municipalities, the AFL-CIO,
and mayors in their official capacity, but accorded standing to mayors as in-
dividuals.2' The federal district court in Connecticut expressed concern regarding
standing because the plaintiff was overrepresented in the state senate, which was
the subject of the suit, and underrepresented only in the house.2" But the court
noted that in any event additional parties could easily be added. Questions
whether state governors are necessary or proper defendants, in addition to the
21 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-204 (1962).
22 Id. at 202.
23 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946). In one line of his Colegrove opinion Justice Frankfurter
kept alive the idea which the Court had alluded to earlier in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355,
366-67 (1932), that article one, section four of the Constitution confers a plenary and exclu-
sive power on Congress over congressional districts, thus posing a constitutional barrier to
judicial jurisdiction. But he also talked of the inadvisability of judicial entry into the "polit-
ical thicket," which seems to concede jurisdiction but oppose justiciability. Id. at 556.
24 On the separable question of whether congressional district suits should be dismissed
on nonjusticiability - want of equity grounds (as distinct from lack of "jurisdiction") -
there has been no authoritative ruling. The tenor of Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court
in Baker discounts the idea that the Colegrove precedent has even this much life left in it.
Further, the failure of congressional district suits in recent months in federal courts in New
York, Georgia, Washington, and Wisconsin, and in state supreme courts in Florida and Mis-
souri, was commonly rested on the facts rather than on lack of jurisdiction or nonjusticiability,
with the possible exception of the Georgia case. Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. 460
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 950);
Lund v. Mathas, 145 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962); Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D.
Ga. 1962), prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 507);
Thigpen v. Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Wash. 1962); State of Wisconsin v. Zimmerman,
209 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Wisc. 1962); Preisler v. Hearnes, 362 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1962).
The Georgia case is discussed at length in a comment: Challenges to Congressional Districting:
After Baker v. Carr Does Colegrove v. Green Endure?, 63 COLUm. L. REV. 98 (1963).
25 State of Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 205 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wisc. 1962). The court
said the matter could not be litigated "unless two or more individual Wisconsin electors are
named as parties plantiff." Id. at 676.
26 After five electors were joined as coplaintiffs the court denied a motion to dismiss the
state as party plaintiff on the ground that the state now had the basis for assuming the role
of parens patriae. See State of Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, C.A. 3540, Findings and Order,
Aug. 22, 1962, as published in 3 NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT DECISIONS ON
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONAIENT (1962).
27 State of Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 209 F. Supp. 183, 184 (W.D. Wisc. 1962).
28 League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189 (D. Neb. 1962).
29 Valenti v. Dempsey, 211 F. Supp. 911 (D. Conn. 1962).
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defendant election officials, have been raised in Oklahoma" and Virginia. 1
A more interesting question, but one seldom discussed in the briefs or
opinions, is whether a doctrine of federal abstention should operate, at least
temporarily, in those states, unlike Tennessee,3 2 where initiative process is avail-
able or where interpretation and relief have not been sought from the state
judiciary in the period since the Supreme Court removed doubts about justici-
ability. Such hesitancy has not been forthcoming, however, and the few cases
to touch on the point have concluded in favor of acting and against abstention. 3
The courts have tended to see in apportionment suits only a personalized civil
right, thus ignoring the complexity of a voting right intertwined inextricably
with broad questions of bicameral representative government. On this faulty
premise it has not been hard to brush aside pleas for prior resort to the state
courts.
Breakdown of the Adversary Method
At least one major new dimension has arisen under the broad rubric of
justiciability, and it relates to the traditional common law requirement of
adversity. We seem to be witnessing a breakdown of the adversary method in
some of the apportionment cases. The primary defendants in these cases are
executive branch officials who conduct elections and the minimum relief sought
is a declaration of invalidity of the apportionment statutes and an injunction
against their continued use. But in some states, such as Oklahoma, where
Governor (now Senator) Edmundson has repeatedly campaigned for reappor-
tionment, the executive branch defendants already favored reapportionment;3 4
30 See three-judge federal district court hearing on new legislative apportionment enacted
in response to previous judicial direction, Moss. v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885, 898 (W.D.
Okla. 1962), as reported in Oklahoma City Times, March 8, 1963, p. 1, col. 7.
31 Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962) (governor and attorney general
dismissed because they had no "special relation" to the elections in suit). The abstention
issue is discussed at length in Judge Hoffman's dissenting opinion, 213 F. Supp. at 589-90,
and in Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement, Davis v. Mann, prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L.
WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 797).
32 Baker v. Carr was an end-of-the-line case. Relief had been sought unsuccessfully in
the state court (Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956), appeal dismissed,
352 U.S. 920 (1956)) before suit was filed in federal district court, and Tennessee had no
provision for popular initiative of statutes or constitutional amendments.
33 Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1962); Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp.
577 (E.D. Va. 1962), prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No.
797). One of the questions presented in the current appeal to the Supreme Court is whether
the federal district court should have declined jurisdiction conformably with the doctrine of
abstention.
A late development in the Oklahoma litigation prompted a special appeal to the United
States Supreme Court in 1963. State senators who felt that the federal district court had
misread the state constitution in the course of its order for reapportionment, Moss v. Burkhart,
207 F. Supp. 885, 898-99 (W.D. Okla. 1962), appeal dismissed sub nom. Price v. Moss, 31
U.S.L. WEEK 3407 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 688), sought from the state supreme court
a bill quia timet for a redetermination of the requirements of the Oklahoma Constitution.
The federal district court then enjoined the proceedings in the state Supreme Court, January
15, 1963, and an appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court citing inter alia
such federal abstention cases as Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), Railroad Comm'n
of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), and Government Employees v. Windsor,
353 U.S. 364 (1957). The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, Baldwin v. Moss, 31 U.S.L.
WEEK 3407 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 864).
34 Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885, 888-90 (W.D. Okla. 1962). For an illuminating
discussion of the parties, their positions, and judicial attitude see Jurisdictional Statement of
the Intervenors (state senators and Oklahomans for Local Government), Price v. Moss,
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or, as in Michigan, began to argue for reapportionment as soon as the issue of
justiciability was removed."s In effect this yields two sets of "plaintiffs" asserting
the unconstitutionality of the state apportionment system. The defense is left
to such additional defendants as may have been allowed to intervene earlier in
the litigation, s" or who may be allowed to intervene at the last minutes" when
it becomes apparent that the nominal defendants in the executive branch are
going to be complaisant. Surprisingly enough, the federal district court in Okla-
homa last spring only begrudgingly allowed some state senators to intervene,"
even though without them a major and exceptionally murky federal constitu-
tional issue would have been decided without opportunity for argument, in an
essentially ex parte proceeding.3
The time may come when judges who are alert to avoid imposition on
judicial process by friendly parties may have to give fresh consideration to the
problem of adequately informing the court. The problem is not novel but has
been aggravated both by heightened judicial awareness of the polycentric nature
of legal problems and by steady proliferation of social complexities resulting
from advances in technology. There are broad areas of law, particularly public
law, where a litigant's problems and conceptions are not coterminous, except
fortuitously, with the public policy dimensions of the issue."0
Supreme Court of the United States (No. 688, 1962 Term). A Motion to Stay and Supersede
was denied by Justice White, Oklahoma City Times, March 7, 1963, p. 1, col. 8.
35 Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), following remand from
United States Supreme Court 369 U.S. 429 (1962). See Brief for James M. Hare, Secretary
of State of the State of Michigan, Respondent, in Opposition, p. 13, Beadle v. Scholle and
Hare, Supreme Court of the United States (No. 517, 1962 Term), where the Michigan
attorney general explained his "higher duty to defend the Constitution of the United States
when its provisions came in conflict with the provisions of the Michigan Constitution. .. ."
36 In the Michigan case certain state senators and citizens had intervened as early as
1960, Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960).
37 E.g., Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962).
38 Ibid.
39 In the Delaware litigation the adversary process was cramped because certain de-
fendants who were members of the Boards of Canvass and also judges in the state court
system felt that "as judicial officers serving in ministerial capacities" it would be "inappro-
priate to take a position on the merits of this lawsuit ... " Sincock v. Terry, 210 F. Supp.
396, 399 n. 1 (D. Del. 1962).
This eventuality further illustrates the extreme inadvisability of imposing nonjudicial
responsibilities on judges. But judicial prestige exercises a steady pull in that direction. See
VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE
(1953); Dixon, The Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 23 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 501, 636-39
(1955).
40 Cf. the recent request of the Interstate Commerce Commission to Congress for money
to staff an eight-man bureau of lawyers and economists to represent the "public interest" in
key cases. Washington Post, February 11, 1963, p. 8, col. 1. Also see ICC testimony in
Hearings on Independent Office Appropriations for 1963 Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Appropriations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 499 (1962).
The problem of representation of "public interest" in administrative proceedings was
discussed by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure in its monograph
on the ICC. 1941 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, MEM-
ORANDUm No. 24 at 28. Several administrative and regulatory agencies have employed "public
counsel" to represent the interests of the using or consuming public. See, e.g., Department
of Commerce, 46 C.F.R. § 201.42 (1958); Civil Aeronautics Board (designated as "Bureau
Counsel"), 14 C.F.R. § 302.9 (1962); Federal Communications Commission ("the appro-
priate Bureau Chiefs"), 47 C.F.R. § 1.21 (b) (1958). A "Public Counsel Section" was
established in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice in 1961 to "represent the
public interest in competition and in preservation of a free competitive economy." Antitrust
Division, Department of Justice, Directive No. 17, Nov. 2, 1961. For a negative view on
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Public intervenor statutes,"S designed for situations where public laws are
under limited private attack, by their nature offer no solution in those appor-
tionment cases where the government is in effect attacking itself. The equitable
device of appointing a master may be better adapted to problems requiring
extensive value-weighing along with detailed "fact" finding4 The master device
has the virtues of close relationship to the court and adaptability to research tech-
niques. The amicus curiae device has acquired great flexibility but often rests
on private initiative. More recently, it has undergone a transformation from
advisor to advocate, and this transformation has affected also the role of the
federal Solicitor General."3 Both in Baker v. Carr and in Gray u. Sanders the
Solicitor was essentially a vigorous coplaintiff, and not above wrapping prec-
edent to the desired end, in traditional appellate advocacy style.' Awareness,
or concern, regarding the nonadversary nature of some apportionment litiga-
tion may be minimal in states following the tradition of popular election of
judges, whether on partisan or nominally nonpartisan tickets.
Equally distressing is the unsatisfactory quality in some apportionment
the need for independent "public counsel" see Miller, The Use of Public Counsel by Federal
Regulatory Agencies, 6 FED. B. NEWS 211 (1959).
Apart from the relatively precise concept of "public counsel" in the regulatory process,
there has been steady pressure for more "consumer" representation in governmental affairs
generally. Senator Kefauver and a bipartisan group of 21 other senators introduced a bill
in 1961 to create a Department of Consumers to secure more effective federal representation
of economic interests of consumers and to coordinate the administration of consumer services
now scattered through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Depart-
ment of Labor.
Following a Presidential Message to Congress on March 15, 1962, a Consumer Advisory
Council was created informally in the Council of Economic Advisors. It functions under the
chairmanship of Dean Helen G. Canoyer of the State College of Home Economics, Cornell
University, with the liaison officers in the departments, regulatory commissions, and indepen-
dent agencies. See Presidential Message, H.R. Doc. No. 364, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962);
White House Press Release for July 18, 1962; Council of Economic Advisors Press Releases
for September 14, 1962, January 31, 1963, March 20, 1963, and March 25, 1963.
In this regard the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy's recent collection
of essays, THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Friedrich ed. 1962), is a promising failure. None of the
essayists purport to deal with anything so mundane - or so practical and relevant to human
experience - as the actual state of "public interest" (or consumer) representation in the
administrative law making and decisional process, or in public administration generally.
For other theoretical discussions see SMITH, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1960),
a helpful discussion of functional, proportional, and geographic representation; CASSINELLI,
THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC STATE (1961);
LEYS & PERRY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1959); SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (1960).
41 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (1958).
42 See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920), concerning the inherent power of a
federal court to direct a reference to a master, and the discussion of Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 CoLuMI. L.
REV. 452 (1958).
43 Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L. J. 694
(1963).
44 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Reargument, pp. 52, 54,
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The brief treats Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932),
so as to create in the mind of one unfamiliar with the facts of the case the misleading
impressions that the Court had held that substantive federal standards on congressional
districting by state legislatures were justiciable, and that the Court had ordered an election
at large. This misleading impression is copied and magnified in 1961 UNITED STATES COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, VOTING (Book 1) 123, 128. For full discussion of Smiley see
Dixon, supra note 5, at 340-43.
As Harry D. Nims has observed, "The adversary system is a sort of legal personification
of the principle that all is fair in love and war." Nims, The Cost of Justice, 28 CONN. B.J. 1,
2 (1954).
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briefs and apportionment opinions since Baker, attributable in part to intrinsic
complexities in apportionment, in part to deficiencies in the adversary method
for this kind of litigation, and in part to the unpaid status of counsel.4" Unless
further judicial ingenuity is forthcoming to solve the problem the organized bar
should deem it its responsibility, in league with informed social scientists, to
devise means for more effectively canvassing the full range of possibilities and
considerations, legal, social, political, economic, historic, which mesh in an
apportionment case.
C. THE PROBLEM OF "STANDARDS": AN ELEMENT IN
CALCULATING APPROPRIATE RELIEF
In approaching the question of higher-law standards to fix the outer
boundaries of permissible political experimentation with democratic forms, the
popular understandings of acceptable apportionment formulae, as evidenced
by the formal apportionment formulae in state organic law, are certainly
relevant, even if not controlling. Whatever the figures reveal - and there cer-
tainly are some careless and questionable summations" - they do not reveal
a primary reliance on the simple population principle of one man-one vote and
equal district population. On the eve of Baker v. Carr, 30 state constitutions
departed materially from a pure population standard for the upper house, and
'34 for the lower house. The current figures, as nearly as can be ascertained
from reports on changes in some states since Baker v. Carr, are substantially
unchanged, so far as formal apportionment formulae are concerned, even though
in some states the population factor now plays a larger role either in formula or
in practice than formerly. At present 29 state apportionment formulae depart
materially from a pure population standard for the upper house, and 34 for
the lower house. [See Chart I] In making these analyses it is vital to take into
45 Both plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel, including some whose briefs bear the marks
of careful workmanship, have indicated in letters to this writer that they were not personally
satisfied with their briefs, a factor to be attributed in some instances to their status as unpaid
counsel. As humorously put by the plaintiff's attorney in the Washington case, Thigpen v.
Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Wash. 1962):
It does not appear that the legislature will be able to come up with a plan
which will satisfy the Federal Court, and I am afraid that this may turn out
to be a career from the point of view of the plaintiff's attorney. Unfor-
tunately, our $1.00 contingency fee has been paid, and we are trying to
dream up some way of either charging the state or taking our time off
income as a charitable contribution.
Letter to author from M.L. Borawick of Midway, Washington, March 22, 1963.
46. E.g., the annual tabulations in the BOOK OF THE STATES, which is the starting point
for many counts by other writers. In several instances states are listed as having a "popula-
tion" formula even though the same state constitutional section adds qualifications which
materially impair the population principle such as minimum or maximum limits on the
number of representatives per county, coupled with a fixed ceiling on the size of the legisla-
ture, and other special provisos. See, e.g., BooK OF THE STATES 58 (1962-63), and BAKER,
STATE CONSTITUTIONS: REAPPORTIONMENT 64 (1960), both of which list the California
lower house as resting on a simple population formula. However, the California Constitution
art. IV, § 6, in addition to specifying "as nearly equal in population as may be," also pro-
vides that in forming lower house districts (a maximum of 80 for 54 counties) no part of
any county shall be united with any other county, no matter how sparse the population.
The most accurate and painstaking descriptions are found in NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,
COMPENDIUM ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT (1962). See also the tabulation as of January,
1962, forthcoming in READINGS ON REAPPORTIONMENT (Schubert ed. 1963, in press).
47 See Chart III in Dixon, supra note 5, at 387.
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account the extent to which what appears at first glance to be a population
standard is materially transformed into a geographic distribution standard. The
transformation is accomplished by such qualifying provisos as the guarantee of
one seat per county, or a limit on the number of seats allocable to any county
regardless of population, or a low ceiling on the total size of the house or senate,
and by numerous other combinations of provisos."
Failure to notice and adequately consider such provisos embedded in the
basic apportionment formulae account for some of the inaccurate counts which
one sees reported. A recent document of the United States Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations states at several places, without supporting
documentation, that the original constitutional provisions of 36 states contained
apportionment provisions based completely or substantially on population.49
The accuracy of this statement may be doubted in the light of the frequency
from the earliest days of the kinds of provisos mentioned above. The constitu-
tions in 1790 of the 13 original states did not fit this mold, nor their constitutions
a century later in the Civil War period.5"
The past understandings of the states on apportionment formulae, which
of course can be separated from the actual apportionments made or allowed to
continue under such formulae, take on added meaning in relation to the vague-
ness of the constitutional clauses under which courts review apportionments.
The constitutional clauses primarily relevant to apportionment matters - the
guarantee of a "republican form of government," the substantive side of "due
process," and "equal protection" - are woefully vague and have not taken on
intelligible coloration through the process of judicial review. Basically, as Justice
Frankfurter noted, apportionment cases are really "republican form of govern-
ment" cases masquerading as equal protection cases."' But even if the guaranty
clause be laid aside and the apportionment cases be approached under the
equal protection clause, neither this clause nor its past interpretations provide
guidance for judicial restructuring of the composition of American legislatures.
The Ambiguity of Equal Protection
In the field of race problems, which of course gave rise to the equal pro-
tection clause in the first place, we have shaped a constitutional absolute. Govern-
mental action must be color blind. But apart from racial matters the most striking
things about pre-Baker v. Carr equal protection cases are the inexactness of
the principles articulated by the courts, and the major stress on a presumption
of constitutionality.5" Indeed, the cases are handled in substantially the same
fashion as substantive due process cases, under a reasonableness-basic liberty
analysis.
A recent example is McGowan v. Maryland,3 and the packet of Sunday
48 For further elaboration see Israel, Non-Population Factors Relevant to an Acceptable
Standard of Apportionment, forthcoming in August 1963 issue of NOTRE DAME LAWYER.
49 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, APPORTIONMENT OF
STATE LEGISLATURES 10, 11, 14, 35 (1962).
50 See Charts I and II in Dixon, supra note 5, at 385, 386.
51 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 297 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
52 HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY (1960).
53 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See also Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366
U.S. 582 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld
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Closing cases decided with it, in which equal protection was one of the featured
issues. Exemptions of certain kinds of business and commodities from the Sun-
day Closing rule were challenged as constituting invidiously discriminatory classi-
fications in violation of the equal protection clause. But the classifications were
upheld on the basis of the purposes of avoiding interruption of health service,
or promoting the recreational atmosphere of the day. But whether health and/or
recreation were valid legislative purposes was simply assumed without discussion.
Although health may be conceded as an obviously valid legislative purpose, only a
small fraction of the exemptions could be sustained on that ground. To be honest
about it, what we have in the Sunday Closing laws is a legislative "assist" to
what Professor Kauper refers to as the "transformation of Sunday from a reli-
gious into a civil holiday" ' for rest and relaxation. In using McGowan and other
nonapportionment equal protection cases as precedents in the apportionment
field, the unfilled part of the equation is the identification of the valid legislative
purposes to which the particularized and detailed apportionment rules are
relevant.
If the underlying purposes in the apportionment cases are not self-ap-
parent, as are health and recreation, who has the burden of proving their
existence or nonexistence? And who has the burden of showing that the classi-
fications are themselves reasonable, and reasonably related to the underlying
reasonable purposes? Chief Justice Warren's opinion in McGowan, like the
statements in other cases cited by him, goes on to speak of a presumption that
the legislatures have acted within their constitutional power. If followed in the
apportionment cases this would seem to place upon the challenger of the existing
apportionment system the burden of showing that the particular rules could
not be relevant to any conceivable valid legislative purpose. As Chief Justice
Warren phrased it: "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state
of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it .... ,,55
In the light of the McGowan precedeit, let us look at the Michigan ap-
portionment case, and for present discussion purposes lay aside the fact that the
recently adopted Michigan constitution" may moot the case, or materially alter
it. In his brief in the United States Supreme Court, in the current appeal" from
the Michigan Supreme Court's invalidation of the state senate last summer,"8
following the remand59 after Baker v. Carr, the Michigan attorney general
asserted the unconstitutionality of his state constitution's then applicable senate
apportionment formula."0 He properly stated that a statute whose discrimina-
tions are so unreasonable that no conceivable fact situation could justify them
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In all four cases the challengers of the Sunday Closing
laws, whether or not their own religion was revealed, were found to have standing to raise
both the equal protection issue and the first amendment establishment of religion issue.
54 KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTON 22 (1962).
55 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
56 Approved in a popular referendum April 1, 1963, N.Y. Times, April 3, 1963, p. 24,
col. 3.
57 Beadle v. Scholle and Hare, petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Oct.
15, 1962) (No. 517).
58 Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962).
59 Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
60 Brief for James M. Hare, Secretary of State of the State of Michigan, Respondent,
In Opposition, p. 13, Beadle v. Scholle and Hare, No. 517.
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will be nullified. He also stated the corollary rule that in all other instances the
burden is on the challenger "to affirmatively demonstrate that in the actual
state of facts which surround its operation"'" the classification is unreasonable.
He then asserted that Michigan's senate apportionment fell in the first category,
that it was so "patently without reason"' 2 that the matter of burden of proof
and presumption of constitutionality was of no significance. For this last proposi-
tion he relied on Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in McGowan.
Equal Protection and "Reasonableness - Rationality"
This approach is a mischaracterization of Justice Frankfurter's position, as
revealed by Frankfurter's actual decision in the Sunday Closing cases, and it
brings us right to the heart of the problem of equal protection as a constitu-
tional standard in apportionment cases. The Sunday Closing laws were sustained
despite obvious illogical differences in the exemption formulae, 3 and the dif-
ferential impact on substantially similar commodities and types of business. They
were sustained also even though, like the apportionment cases, they border on civil
rights, and thus are not readily allocable to the line of business regulation-equal
protection cases in which the Court has looked kindly on legislative experimenta-
tion in economic affairs.' The essence of Justice Frankfurter's position, which
amplified but did not conflict with Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court
in McGowan, is that "neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection
Clause demands logical tidiness .... It is enough to satisfy the Constitution that
in drawing [lines of distinction] the principle of reason has not been disre-
garded."'" With such elusiveness of principle, he also felt that evidence of di-
vergent state practice is quite relevant in deciding where to draw the line of
constitutional reasonableness.6 6
Where the Michigan attorney general goes astray - and in this he
has much company in the briefs and lower court apportionment opinions"7
since Baker v. Carr, and in Justice Clark's concurring opinion in Baker itself6"
- is in confusing the concept of rationality with the principle of reasonableness.
To be sure, Justice Frankfurter in his McGowan opinion switches back and
forth between the ideas of "reasonableness" and of "rationality." 9 But if one
61 Id. at 21.
62 Id. at 28.
63 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 535-42.
64 HARRIs, op. cit. supra note 52, at 57-81. Cf. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and
the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial 1962 SUPREME COURT REVIEW 34, and
especially his penetrating critique of the supposed distinction and differential priority between
"economic rights" and "civil rights."
65 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 524. (Emphasis added.)
66 Id. at 536.
67 E.g., Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 345, 348 (M.D. Tenn. 1962); Moss v. Burk-
hart, 207 F. Supp. 885, 891 (W.D. Okla. 1962); Thigpen v. Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826,
831 (W.D. Wash. 1962).
68 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 254, 260 (1962) (concurring opinion).
69 For example, he says:
But the very diversity of judicial opinion as to what is a reasonable classi-
fication -like the conflicting views on what is such "necessity" as will
justify Sunday operations - testifies that the question of inclusion with
regard to Sunday bans is one where judgments rationally differ, and hence
where a State's determinations must be given every fair presumption of
a reasonable support in fact. The restricted scope of this Court's review
of state regulatory legislation under the Equal Protection Clause . . . is of
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pushes beyond semantics to the core of meaning it is obvious that he is 'talking
about reasonableness of impact, not strict logical or rational consistency in the
legislative distinctions and classifications.
Indeed, an "irrational plan," i.e., illogical, unprincipled, possessed of in-
ternal inconsistencies, may have a reasonable effect, and that is all the Constitu-
tion requires at the level of judicial review of public choice. This distinction be-
tween constitutional reasonableness and logical rationality is vital to an under-
standing of the judicial handling of cases like the Sunday Closing law cases.
It is equally relevant to the far greater factual and conceptual difficulties in-
volved in the theory and practice of representative government, which is really
what "apportionment" is all about."0
Failure to make this distinction has led some courts since Baker to make
"quickie" judgments against the constitutionality of legislatures. Where the un-
derrepresentation of people is gross, the end result may be applauded, but the
formulary process used approaches gimmickry."' The court accepts mathematical
proof in the nature of arithmetic abstractions which shows major numerical dis-
parities in size of districts and allocation of representatives, and it states in con-
clusionary fashion that "invidious discrimination" exists. Next, and this is a
very critical point, the court shifts the burden of proof to the defenders to show
a "rational plan." By "rational plan" is meant a plan which is internally con-
sistent and proceeds logically from a set of identifiable and clear principles. But
how can there be a rational plan for the highly political process of compromise
and adjustment regarding apportionment and districting, or indeed, regarding
legislation generally? Judicial insistence on rational plans of apportionment con-
fuses the reasoned process of adjudication with the intricate process of multi-
laterally negotiated settlements which characterizes the political-legislative
arena.72 By thus shifting the burden of proof after finding that population dis-
long standing. . . . The applicable principles are that a state statute may
not be struck down as offensive of equal protection in its schemes of
classification unless it is obviously arbitrary, and that, except in the case
of a statute whose discriminations are so patently without reason that no
conceivable situation of fact could be found to justify them, the claimant
who challenges the statute bears the burden of affirmative demonstration
that in the actual state of facts which surround its operation, its classifica-
tions lack rationality. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 532-35. (Emphasis added.)
70 See DE GazrA, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 9 (1963): "The
system called democratic representative government is probably the most complicated political
structure ever deliberately employed by man." See also DE GRAZIA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC:
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN AMERICA (1951); DE GRAzIA, General Theory of Apportion-
ment, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 256 (1952); SMITH, op. cit. supra note 40.
71 See, e.g., the Oklahoma and Washington cases cited supra note 67. See also Mann
v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577, 584 (E.D. Va. 1962); Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471
(D. Colo. 1962); Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d" 350 (1962); Sincock v.
Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1963), but the Delaware federal court did discuss at
length the possible "rationality" of giving "some weight" to nonpopulation factors in the
apportionment formula for one house.
Other courts, whether or not reaching correct decisions, have eschewed the simple
population disparity-burden of proof-rational plan gimmick, e.g., W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon,
208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y 1962); Lund v. Mathas, 145 So. 2d. 871 (Fla. 1962) (congres-
sional districts); Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 209 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Wis. 1962); Maryland
Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (1962).
72 Cf. EisENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961) and tax legislation in general
where, as in apportionment, there is a mathematical basis and a desire for "equal treatment."
In the hammering out of exemptions and exceptions the political weight of the proponent
may be more important than the intrinsic "rationality" of the proposed exemption.
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parities alone make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination, the courts
are really skirting the basic constitutional issue of what constitutes a fair ap-
portionment.
Burden of Proof and Civil Liberties
On the question of shifting the burden of proof, it is sometimes stated, as
in the challengers' briefs in the Michigan case,73 that the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant in civil liberties and civil rights cases, by which is really meant
a reversal of the presumption of constitutionality. Also it is assumed, sub silentio,
that apportionment presents just one more civil liberties issue. Both the state-
ment and the assumption are shaky. The voter's civil right or liberty is inter-
twined with the larger question of the nature of representative government, as
already mentioned. And in any event the precedents are not at all clear in
establishing a reversal of the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties
cases, even in the first amendment area. We have heard strong arguments for
the "firstness of the First," and the results in some cases do seem slanted in that
direction."4 But these are cases where a distinctly and uniquely personal impact
of state policy is at issue, rather than dilution of the mixed personal-political
exercise of the franchise. For example, in Bates v. Little Rock,7" concerning dis-
closure of NAACP membership lists, the Court said that where "there is a
significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only
upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling."76 And it concluded
that "the municipalities have failed to demonstrate a controlling justification
for the deterrence of free association which compulsory disclosure of the mem-
bership lists would cause." 7
But this precedent is quite inapropos in relation to apportionment- equal
protection. The basic constitutional right - freedom of association - which
underlay Bates was already established,"8 and the fact of infringement or detri-
mental effect resulting from disclosure was taken as established by evidence sub-
mitted by the parties asserting the constitutional right. They showed that their
membership was harassed, restive, or declining. Only then was it incumbent on
the state to show justification.
In contrast, in the apportionment cases the basic constitutional right is
not yet established, i.e., the question of a right to numerical equality in either
or both houses, or a right to a minimum relation of population to representation
in at least one house, or a right to a formula which weighs population heavily
in regard to both houses although not placing sole reliance on it for either house.
Hence, it should remain with the plaintiff to articulate his theory of federal
right, and to adduce proof in terms of his articulated theory. NAACP v.
73 Brief in Opposition of Respondent Scholle, p. 15, Beadle v. Scholle and Hare, Supreme
Court of the United States (No. 517, 1962 Term).
74 KAUPER, op. cit. supra note 54, at 112; McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1182 (1959).
75 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
76 Id. at 524.
77 Id. at 527.
78 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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Alabama,79 the case which established the right of freedom of association which
underlay the Bates case, lends itself to a similar analysis.
Plaintiffs' requests to shift the burden of proof could be made regardless
of the constitutional clause used as the basis for apportionment litigation, but
they are especially likely to be granted when equal protection is cited as the
basis for the suit. The tendency is to translate "equal protection" into "equal
population," without discussing the conceptual and practical complexities of
representation, and then to switch the burden of proof as soon as the easily
proven population disparities are shown. The act of registering and casting a
ballot is a relatively simple matter. But the effectiveness of a vote in an indirect
democracy, and the permissibility of apportionment-districting arrangements
whose effect may be to require a broader consensus than 51 per cent to shape
affirmative public policies, is not at all a simple matter.
Mathematics and Popular Will
The mathematical evidence on which some courts have relied so heavily
is also subject to major qualifications - it proves either far too much, or too
little.8" Urban-suburban population figures are contrasted with rural popula-
tion figures. But do not cities and suburbs oppose each other vigorously? 8 '
79 Id. at 460, 462-63.
80 See DE GRAZIA, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1963). And in
the New York case, in their motion to dismiss the appeal or affirm, p. 14, W.M.C.A., Inc.
v. Simon, prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 460), the
appellees observed that under a strict population theory plaintiffs "would likewise succeed
in making a prima facie case on the barest statistical showing in virtually every state of the
union. . . . There is no reason to suspect unconstitutionality from a commonplace."
Professor Israel observes:
It is in the light of the requirement of a "republican" form of government
that the essentiality of per capita equality of representation must be
judged: If reasoned, non-population bases for apportioning state legislatures
are considered "irrational," it is only because the concept of republican
form of government, possibly as supplemented by historical practice and
other parts of the Constitution, requires a representative democracy based
upon complete political equality of the individual. Israel, On Charting a
Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The Future of Baker v.
Carr, 61 MICe. L. REV. 107, 135 (1962).
See also Lucas, Legislative Apportionment and Representative Government: The Meaning
of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 711 (1963); Krastin, The Implementation of Represen-
tative Government in a Democracy, 48 IOWA L. REV. 549 (1963).
For a more uncritical acceptance of "one man-one vote" and a simple majoritarianism,
and an exclusive reliance on equal protection as the relevant constitutional clause, see McKay,
Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L.
RV. 645 (1963); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ONE MAN-ONE VOTE (Conference Pamphlet
1962); and see McKay, The Federal Analogy and State Apportionment Standards, forth-
coming in August 1963 issue of NOTRE DAME LAWYER.
Among the petitions and briefs one of the more sophisticated critiques of exclusive
reliance on mathematical evidence is found in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the State of Michigan, Beadle v. Scholle, petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK
3147 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 517), (prepared by Edmund E. Shepherd). Mr. Alfred
L. Scanlan, attorney for the plaintiffs in Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v.
Tawes calls for an equally sophisticated approach on the plaintiffs' side of the issue, recog-
nizing the need to go beyond mathematical proof to a "Brandeis brief" approach, putting
mathematics in the setting of actual operation of the legislature on particular issues. See
Scanlan, Problems of Pleading, Proof and Persuasion in a Reapportionment Case, infra, at
415, 426-28.
81 In the period from 1950-1961, 10 of 18 proposals for city-county consolidation or
other governmental integration failed to pass the popular referendum hurdle. Only two
of the 10 which failed of adoption owed their defeat directly to the demand for concurrent
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Even within the city, is there an identity of interest? And how meaningful are
figures showing that, theoretically, districts with a minority of the state's popula-
tion can control a majority of seats in one or both houses? 2 Application of this
latter abstraction to the United States Senate, using 1960 census data, yields
the following figures. We find that 31 million people in the 26 least populous
states, representing only 17 per cent of the population of the United States,
have 52 per cent of the representatives in the United States Senate.83 Yet it
is obvious that the 52 senators from these 26 states do not vote as a bloc, dis-
regarding party, economic, philosophic and other considerations.
The nation's apportionment problem is serious, but it is also far more
complicated than many of the opinions indicate. Certainly a vital component
of representation is people. Representation systems which perpetually deny large
majorities any effective influence in both houses of a legislature are unreasonable
under the fourteenth amendment. But they are unconstitutionally unreasonable
not because they deviate from a simple one man-one vote principle, but because
minority process is not due process. Additionally, such systems may be uncon-
stitutional under the clause guaranteeing a "republican form of government." 4
Among our most distinctive contributions to politics are our awkward
checks and balances system, our decentralized political party system, and the
relative freedom of legislators from party discipline. These things are not an
majorities. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FACTORS AFFECTING
VOTER REACTIONS TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 21-22,
24, 27 (1962). See also Derge, Metropolitan and Outstate Alignments in Illinois and Missouri
Legislature Delegations, 52 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1065 (1958); STEINER & GOVE, LEGISLATIVE
POLITICS IN ILLINOIS (1960).
82 The figures are obtained by placing the legislative districts for each house in rank order
of population, and by counting from the smallest population end of the list a sufficient distance
to accumulate the minimum population which could elect a majority of the house in question.
See Dauer & Kelsay, Unrepresentative States, 44 NAT. MUNICIPAL REV. 571 (1955).
This line of analysis, seeking to ascertain the minimum population minority that theoretical-
ly could control, is often virtually a meaningless abstraction as applied to a multimembered
body (i.e., legislature) because of the factors of political party alignments and interest
representation. For example, although there are population disparities among some of the
districts for the New York State legislature, the results in the 1962 election, cast in terms of
party representation were reasonably equitable. For the state senate, a state-wide Republican
legislative 'vote (as distinguished from the vote for Governor) of 2,704,786 captured 33 seats,
and a state-wide Democratic legislative vote of 2,534,378 captured 25 seats. For the state
assembly (lower house), the comparable figures were: Republican, 2,690,795 votes, 85 seats;
Democratic, 2,567,115 votes, 65 seats. However, if all of the Liberal Party vote be added to
the Democratic figure it becomes 2,821,293. Source: Data received from Election and Law
Bureau, New York State Department of State.
The analysis may have greater utility as an index of fairness-unfairness as applied to
election of a single officer under a vote weighting system such as the electoral college formula
for electing a President, because the alignment factors cannot divide one man. See, e.g., the
observation by the Solicitor General in the Georgia County Unit case, Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, p. 45, Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). The Solicitor noted
that whereas a comparison solely of the weight of a vote for the presidency in the largest
and smallest state shows great disparity, an analysis in terms of the least population that
theoretically could elect a President under the electoral system shows that an electoral college
majority (270 votes) could not be derived from less than the 40 least populous states, and
these states do have 43.21 per cent of the population. This may be viewed as a respectable
figure, even though falling short of strict population equality.
83 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 10
(1962).
84 See Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican
Government, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 245 (1962); Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power,
72 YALE L. J. 64 (1962).
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unmixed blessing, but they have given us a politics of consensus rather than a
politics of majoritarianism s5 Do we no longer fear the tyranny of the majority?
Do we now want a simple majoritarianism?
"One man-one vote" is most closely achieved in state-wide popular referenda
on such things as proposed constitutional amendments - including possible
new apportionment formulae. Assuming a common desire for apportionment
systems which will produce a representative expression of the popular will in
such fashion as to approximate a direct expression of the popular will, these
referenda would seem to have high evidentiary value, even if not dispositive of
the constitutional issue.8" But in states where such votes have occurred they have
not always been viewed as weighty evidence in the decision of apportionment
litigation. In 1952, Michigan voters were faced with two proposals regarding
the state senate. They rejected the one to reapportion the senate under a
population principle; they approved the one based on a geographic distribution
principle.8 7 Despite this background, the Michigan Supreme Court last summer
invalidated the composition of the state senate.8 Last month, the voters there
approved a new state constitution which continues some recognition of area
in the state senate." It is too soon to predict the outcome, but a further invalida-
tion of the state senate by Michigan's judiciary, chosen in elections somewhat
humorously dubbed "nonpartisan," cannot be ruled out.
In the state of Washington, a federal district court last December in-
validated the apportionment of the state legislature even though the voters, a
month earlier, had rejected a new formula based more strictly on population
alone."0 Referring to the defeat of the initiative me?.sure, the court said it had
no way of knowing whether the people did not understand it, whether its op-
ponents were better organized, whether the majority really did not desire
reapportionment, or whether the majority did not approve the proposed method.
But this line of speculation by the court turned out to be shadowboxing because,
moving to a firm philosopher-king position, the court said: "It makes no dif-
ference. The inalienable constitutional right of equal protection cannot be made
to depend upon the will of the majority."'" By contrast, a federal district court
in New York last summer, in refusing to hold unconstitutional the state legisla-
ture, placed considerable stress on the fact that reapportionment had been made
85 See BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY: FOUR PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA
(1963). Professor Jaffe has spoken of democracy as often being "perhaps naively, equated with
formal majorities. Formal majorities register judgments only occasionally, and then as a rule
not on specific issues but on total performance." Jaffe, Standing in Public Actions, 74 HARV.
L. REv. 1265, 1286 (1961).
86 Of course, given a constitutional right such as the right against racial discrimination,
which is clear and simple, which the right of "fair apportionment" by its nature never can be,
a popular expression of preferences is immaterial. See, e.g., referendum against desegregation,
Hall v. School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961).
87 Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960); 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d
350 (1962) ; for more detail see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
State of Michigan, pp. 3-6, Beadle v. Scholle, petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147
(U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 517).
88 Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962).
89 N.Y. Times, April 3, 1963, p. 24, col. 3.
90 Thigpen v. Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Wash. 1962).
91 Id. at 832.
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a major issue by Governor Harriman in the unsuccessful 1957 referendum on
the question of calling a constitutional convention.2
More recent popular referenda results in such other states as Tennessee,
Colorado, California, Oregon and Nebraska are equally interesting. After the
United States Supreme Court decision in Baker, the Tennessee legislature in special
session made a tinker with the apportionment formula, which the federal district
court then held inadequate and unconstitutional under the fourteenth amend-
ment."s But the court gave the legislature a grace period to June 1963 to make a
further modification. Concurrently, however, the legislature had put on the No-
vember 1962 ballot a proposal for a 1965 constitutional convention, delegates to be
chosen on the same basis as legislators. The avowed aim was to have this con-
vention propose a constitutional amendment to abolish the population formulae
of the 1901 Tennessee Constitution (never implemented) and to substitute a
"federal plan" of population emphasis in one house, political subdivision
emphasis in the other house. The people approved the call of such a conven-
tion, 216,977-206,390." Several interesting questions arise from this sequence:
(1) Would it have been proper for the federal district court, if petitioned to,
to have enjoined placing this measure on the ballot? (2) If a federal plan is
proposed by the convention and approved in popular referendum, should it then
be nullified by a state or federal court? (3) Would such a nullification be a nulli-
fication of majoritarianism under the banner of achieving majoritarianism?
Regardless of the composition of the convention, the call of it and the ratifica-
tion of its work would be majoritarian expressions on a one man-one vote basis.
Colorado voters on November 6, 1962, had a choice of two reapportionment
initiative measures. By substantial margins they approved a "federal plan" re-
apportionment, 305,700-172,725, and rejected a plan basing both houses
on a population basis, 149,822-311,749. 9" California voters on November 6,
1962, rejected an initiative measure to force more representation for Los Angeles
and other heavily populated countries, 2,181,758-2,495,440. 96 Oregon has had
a population formula for apportionment of both houses since a successful 1952
initiative measure. On November 6, 1962, voters rejected a new initiative meas-
ure, 197,322-352,182, which would have kept population as the sole standard
for the senate but added area to the lower house apportionment formula.9" In
Nebraska, last fall the voters ratified a constitutional amendment which abandoned
the pure population principle for the unicameral legislature and substituted a
92 W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). For the 1962 state
legislative election results, recast in terms of party representation achieved, see note 82 supra.
Chief Judge Brune, dissenting in the Maryland senate case, not only conceded the
relevance of popular referenda but distinguished the Maryland case from the Michigan and
New York cases on this ground. Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 229
Md. 406, 184 A.2d 715, 723 (1962). Hence, Chief Judge Brune's position was that the
Maryland senate apportionment formula, unsupported by any recent popular referendum,
should be nullified even if the United States Supreme Court eventually should hold valid
the area representation in the Michigan senate.
93 Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
94 21 CONG. QUART. WEEKLY REP. 429 (1963).
95 Id. at 425. A federal court hearing is pending on the question whether the voter-
approved "federal plan" violates the fourteenth amendment.
96 Ibid. The lower house was last reapportioned in 1961, but the senate has been weighted
toward the northern lightly populated counties.
97 Id. at 427.
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formula in which area is to be weighed a minimum of 20 per cent and a maximum
of 80 per cent. Is there room in the republicanism concepts of American federalism
under the federal constitution for multiple concepts of representation? Can there
be a theory focused almost exclusively on population, as in Oregon, and coexisting,
a "federal plan" theory focused at least partly on political subdivisions? The
latter operates, of course, not so much to "diffuse political initiative," as oft-
quoted from McDougall v. Green,"8 as to build in a partial minority veto, thus
necessitating a broader base as a precondition of affirmative governmental
action.
There have been manful attempts to make equal protection and the corol-
lary "one man-one vote" principle respectable as a constitutional guide to "fair"
apportionments,99 but the price is high. The costs include: first, ignoring almost
entirely the political realities of the legislative process; second, citing "race"
cases as being fungible with apportionment cases; third, ignoring or minimizing
the very real difficulty of fairly implementing a one man-one vote principle
even if attempted;'0 0 fourth, overruling "misguided popular majorities" as ex-
pressed in recent popular referenda in some states. How high can higher law
get, nor lose the common touch? l "
The Preferred Standard - Due Process or Equal Protection?
In sum, it seems wrong to use equal protection as a basis for apportion-
ment if that constitutional term is defined as requiring mathematical equality
with the burden on the defenders to explain all deviations. Representation poses
problems too complex to be intelligently settled in this fashion. But if the blinders
be removed and equal protection be interpreted in this nonracial area as re-
quiring a rule of reasonableness and avoidance of arbitrary action, it would be
a quite acceptable constitutional standard. It would also then become virtually
indistinguishable from substantive due process. For this reason, and to avoid
the question begging that has occurred in the use of equal protection in some
of the apportionment cases so far, the better approach would be to start di-
98 335 U.S. 281, 284 (1948).
99 McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection,
61 Micir. L. Rlv. 645 (1963); and see McKay, The Federal Analogy and State Apportion-
ment Standards, forthcoming in August 1963 issue of NOTRE DAME LAWYER; Krastin, The
Implementation of Representative Government in a Democracy, 48 IowA L. REv. 549 (1963).
The latter mixes statistical and political sophistication and political unreality. For example
Professor Krastin properly notes that legislative interest alignments are more complex than
merely rural versus city (Id. at 561-62), and that politics is a power game. But in suggesting
that the lobbyist may be most influential with small constituency legislators (Id. at 565),
he ignores entirely the role of big city machine politics at the initial stage of the ballot box,
e.g., in Chicago, particularly when the "chips are down" as they were in the presidential
election of 1960. There also seems to be at least a hint that the frustrating complexities and
interplay of preferences will be materially altered by a shift to a strict "equal population"
principle. The most startling suggestion is that district lines be drawn at random so as to
remove the human (political) element. Id. at 571. Cf. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMocRATIc
THEORY (1956).
100 See text accompanying notes 106-09 infra. Also see DE GRAZiA, op. cit. supra note 80;
Israel, supra note 80.
101 Cf. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUPREME COURT REViEW 252,
309, who asks whether the electorate may undo a judicially imposed apportionment. Are
constitutional provisions permitting popular amendment of the basis of apportionment them-
selves constitutional? Are all requirements of extraordinary majorities to initiate or enact
constitutional amendments or statutes constitutional?
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rectly with due process, or with the guaranty clause if the latter can be revived.
Cases would become no easier to solve, but the difficult questions concerning
majoritarianism and representative democracy would be faced rather than
skirted.
D. POLITICAL DIMENSIONS
A separate essay could be written on the political dimensions of Baker
v. Carr, and would be just as relevant for courts and lawyers as what has been
said so far. Baker v. Carr broke a political freeze, but the problem remains es-
sentially political." 2 An intellectually sophisticated approach either to standards
or remedies calls for a full rethinking of the purposes and bases of representa-
tion in a mass democracy. This rethinking must take into account the developed
political party system, the jockeying of interest groups who sometimes attain
a balance of power position,' the prevailing public opinion as murkily expressed
in such actions as popular referenda, and the whole western tradition of repre-
sentative government. As Justice Brandeis so wisely observed, "government is
not an exact science," '' and the larger social arrangements are largely a matter
of judgment. This is not the place for an extended discussion, but a few factors
should at least be listed, in suggestive fashion, before we proceed to the ques-
tion of remedies.
If the "one man-one vote" principle means an effective "one vote" would
we not then be pointed in the direction of proportional representation on a state-
wide basis so as to more exactly represent political party loyalities and issue
orientations? The noncongruency between population spread and party mem-
ber spread is a well-known factor, varying in different parts of the country but
often producing serious "party-strength malapportionment."'0 5 But proportional
or functional representation has its own problems, not the least of which is
102 L.e., "political" in the broadest Graeco-Roman sense of the term, and wonderfully
complicated as well. "States do not possess the quality of Miss Stein's roses," as two early
post-Baker commentators perceptively observed. Wheeler and Bebout, After Reapportionment,
51 NAT. Civic REV. 246, 250 (1962). Some early post-Baker comment by political scientists
has been hurried, and confined largely to the level of doctrinal exposition, e.g., Wright, The
Rights of Majorities and of Minorities in the 1961 Term of the Supreme Court, 57 Am. POL.
Sci. REv. 98 (1963). The short treatment by DAVID & EISENBE G, STATE LEGISLATIVE
REDISTRICTING: MAJOR ISSUES IN THE WAKE OF JUDICIAL DECISION (1962) falls short of
its promise, but see the same authors' excellent, ground-breaking study, DEVALUATION OF TiE
URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTE (1961).
103 See the New York City congressional districting case, Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F.
Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), especially Judge Feinberg's concurring opinion. A policy of
consciously including important percentages of nonwhites in all four Manhattan Island
districts, so that they were major minorities in each, and perhaps a majority in none, might
jeopardize the present "Negro-seat" held by Adam Clayton Powell. But such a policy might
increase the total influence of the nonwhites (i.e., Negro and Puerto Rican extraction) on all
four seats. This end may have been the real aim of the plaintiffs in this suit, and thus viewed
was a politically astute move, even though it was vigorously opposed by the Negro beneficiaries
of the present system, including Congressman Powell. It may also be observed that redrawing
lines with this purpose in mind might produce some odd-shaped districts if Harlem were
carved up like pie and linked to other areas of the Island.
As a further example, a Roman Catholic legislator from a city district which is religiously
divided 40% Roman Catholic, 30% Jewish, and 30% Protestant could have an electoral
plurality of 60% or more. But on a public aid to parochial schools issue he might represent
a minority of little more than 40%, whereas on a social welfare expenditure issue he might
represent a 60% majority feeling.
104 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 357 (1921).
105 Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How to "Sear the Conscience" of Legislators, 72 YALE L. J. 23,
24 (1962).
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getting a governing consensus and avoiding unstable coalitions of minority
parties.
The single-member district system better assures retention of a two-party
system and creation of clear majorities, but what kind of a "majority" is
produced? To what extent can it be rigged? The possibilities for "creating"
a majority through the process of careful arrangement of district lines, i.e.,
gerrymandering, are well known. ° But interesting possibilities exist in the process
of apportionment even when existing county lines are used.
Consider the following example, based on two counties and making cer-
tain assumptions concerning population, political party division, representation
before reapportionment, and representation after an "equalizing" reapportion-
ment. Let us assume that County A has 25,000 voters and one seat in the
legislature, which Party Y captures because it has a 20,000 to 5,000 edge over
Party X in that county. Let us assume that County B has 100,000 voters and
also has one seat in the legislature, which Party X captures because it has a
55,000 to 45,000 edge over Party Y in that county. As between the two counties,
the 100,000 voters in County B seem underrepresented by a four to one ratio
because they have only one seat and County A's 25,000 voters also have one
seat. But looking at the political parties in this two-county area we see sub-
stantial equality. Party X has a combined total of 60,000 votes in the two
counties and gets one seat; Party Y a combined total of 65,000 votes and one
seat. If we now reapportion to eliminate the four to one disparity between the
two counties by leaving County A with one seat and raising County B to four
seats we achieve exact numerical equality. But the resultant impact on political
party representation will be that Party X with 60,000 votes in this two-county
area now has four seats, and Party Y with 65,000 votes has only one seat.
To pursue the matter further, if we are serious about majoritarianism how
should we react to such additional restraints on the one man-one vote principle
as provisions for extraordinary majorities in legislative bodies, the filibuster, the
seniority rule in regard to committee chairmanships and the committee system
in general, restraints on bringing bills to the floor, the tendency of the single-
member district system to overrepresent the majority party, and the like?. 7 Unfor-
tunately, the light which existing political research throws on these questions is
distressingly dim. We have known very little about the actual operation of
legislatures, and the relationships between legislators and their constituencies.""8
In the studies which have been made, the focus has tended to be on the more
106 Tabor, The Gerrymandering of State and Federal Legislative Districts, 16 MD. L. REV.
277 (1956).
107 See Neal, supra note 101, at 281.
108 Recent collections or studies which contain much helpful material include LEGISLATIVE
BEHAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH (Wahlke & Eulau ed. 1959), which
includes contributions by a large number of scholars and should be a starting point for further
research; THE POLITICS OF REAPPORTIONMENT (Jewell ed. 1962), a collection of state studies
with a helpful introduction by the editor; JEWELL, THE STATE LEGISLATURE (1962), a
descriptive treatment with an up-to-date bibliography; HAVARD & BETH, THE POLITICS OF
MIS-REPRESENTATION IN THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE (1962). See also, Miller and Stokes,
Constituency Influence in Congress, 57 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 45 (1963); Froman, Inter-Party
Constituency Differences and Congressional Voting Behavior, 57 Am. POL. SCI. REV. 57 (1963);
Hacker, Reapportionment: Who Will Benefit?, CHALLENGE, Feb. 1963, p. 4. See also,
Stokes, Party Loyalty and the Likelihood of Deviating Elections, 24 J. OF POL. 689 (1962).
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obvious factors of party identification, party votes, and party shift. Although
supported by the interview method and mathematical techniques, much of it
may be characterized as objectified armchair research into the more gross and
easily identified aspects of political behavior. There is a real danger that unless
courts become more alert to these political factors they may paint themselves
into a box of pseudomathematical exactness under a one man-one vote talisman.
Such an approach could keep apportionment in perpetual turmoil and at the
same time ignore the political impossibility of nonpolitically arranging districts
of equal population so that no groups or parties will be specially advantaged,
nor disadvantaged." 9
E. JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR MALAPPORTIONMENT
The judicial mission in apportionment has two facets: the familiar one
of reviewing and negating legislative and political excesses; the unfamiliar one
of galvanizing the political branches into more effective discharge of their polit-
ical function of working out a "democratic" representation system. Even the
first mission of reviewing existing apportionments is not as simple as it sounds.
A negative conclusion raises problems which have few counterparts elsewhere
in judicial review. It may put the courts in the position of saying that the state
has no valid legislature, which immediately puts in question the validity of all
acts done by the legislature. Or, in the alternative, it may put the courts in the
position of saying that the current legislature remains validly operative for the
duration of its term and of implying, whether or not an injunction be issued,
that the next legislature will not be a legitimate body if elected under the same
system. But the fears expressed that invalidation of the legislature would leave
no valid government, so that not even a revised apportionment formula could
be enacted, seem to be exaggerated. 1 ' This view denigrates both judicial
creativity and the supremacy of the federal constitutional principles under
which the review is being made. Retroactive impact of judicial nullification of
current doctrine has been avoided in other fields, and such avoidance is nowhere
needed more than in apportionment."' We have come a long way since Justice
109 For a detailed analysis of the political-mathematical complexities see Silva, Legislative
Apportionment- With Special Reference to New York, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 408
(1962); Silva, Apportionment in New York, 30 FORDHAMi L. REV. 581 (1962). As an example
in this area, see the new congressional districts in California.
110 Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956); Maryland Committee for
Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 445, 180 A.2d 656, 674 (1962) (dissenting
opinion); Sincock v. Terry, 207 F. Supp. 205, 207 (D. Del. 1962) (per curiam ruling before
trial on merits). More sophisticated approaches to this question, building out on Justice
Douglas's opinion regarding the creative powers of equity to effectuate federal rights and
interests (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 250 & n. 5) are found in post-Baker opinions in Rhode
Island and Tennessee. Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962); Baker v. Carr, 206 F.
Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
111 Compare People v. Graves, 242 App. Div. 128, 273 N.Y.S. 582 (1934), with James v.
United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961), Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 11.
2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), 24 Ill. 2d 467, 182 N.E.2d 145 (1962); see Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist., 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962). See Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability:
judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Milieu, 15 STAN. L. REV. 163 (1963); Note, Prospective
Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60
HARV. L. REV. 437 (1947).
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Field opined that an "unconstitutional statute is not a law; . . . it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."" 2
The second judicial mission, that of galvanizing the political branches into
action, is far more difficult. From what has been said earlier in this paper, it
is apparent that direct judicial relief would be inappropriate in most instances.
Decisions that a given apportionment system is "unfair," i.e., constitutionally
unreasonable, may be pricked out case by case."' But to decide which of several
possible "fair" systems should be instituted is a straight policy judgment un-
illuminated by anything in federal constitutional law. Courts, if they are to
remain courts, cannot and should not try to function as state constitutional con-
ventions and discharge the high political responsibility of a constituent assembly.
It would, indeed, be far easier, far less political, and far more illuminated by
the racially oriented commands of the fourteenth amendment, for courts to
revise boundaries of segregated school districts and to assess tax levies, than for
courts to venture upon reapportionment. The policy statement issued by the
Twentieth Century Fund conference espousing the deceptively simple one
man-one vote theory seems to concede as much, for the conference statement also
said: "Courts, and especially the Federal courts, wisely shy away from getting
into the actual business of drawing district lines. The function of the court is
rather to goad the political process into action on apportionment."'1 4
But how can courts galvanize? How can they get only part way into the
thicket? "Aye, there's the rub," as Justice Frankfurther has so aptly put it."'
The short answer perhaps is that it is a logical impossibility. But need we
start and stop with logic? Constitutional law, where great powers and great
issues are at stake, is full of "what ifs." Judicial review of acts of Congress and
the President is also a logical impossibility if judicial authority be viewed as
limited by judicial power."' President Lincoln during the Civil War ignored
Chief Justice Taney's habeas corpus writ on behalf of prisoner Merryman, and
got by with it."7 Perhaps a Civil War is sui generis. By contrast, President
112 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).
113 See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
114 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, ONE MAN-ONE VOTE 14 (Conference pamphlet 1962).
One plaintiff's attorney has suggested that more "goading" may be obtainable from a
federal court than a state court:
In my judgment, the most important single appraisal made by plaintiffs'
attorneys as well as those defending an existing apportionment, is the nature
of the forum in which the suit is pending. In many instances, proper venue
may be had in more than one Federal District or State Circuit. More rapid
remedial results seem to have been reached in the Southern Federal Courts
than in those of other sections. My personal belief is that the United States
District judges in the South, having been faced with cantankerous legislatures
and general vilification since Brown v. Board of Education, seem less fearful
of seemingly drastic remedies than do others. Many of the judges of the Fifth
Judicial Circuit have had to fashion decrees with the knowledge that at least
the United States Army would be necessary to carry them out.
Letter to author from Charles Morgan, Jr., Birmingham, Alabama, February 2, 1963.
115 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 269 (1962).
116 See Lucas, Of Ducks and Drakes: Judicial Relief in Reapportionment Cases, infra this
issue, at 401.
117 Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (No. 9,487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861); discussed in
SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 277-81 (1943).
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Truman submitted to judicial review of his seizure of the steel mills during
the Korean War, lost the case, and honored the Court's decision." Apportion-
ment cases are just one more area, in the tradition of the Steel Seizure Case
which fortunately has been our dominant tradition, where judicial review must
rely on the faith - the good faith - of the political officials who are the real
defendants.
Possible Actions
Bearing in mind the pitfalls, the perpetual absence of clear standards, and
assuming also that the Supreme Court will reject the arithmetic abstraction
approach and be sophisticated about the complexities of representation theory
and practice for state legislatures, what actions may be appropriate? The short
answer is, actions appropriate to the constitutional standard being used. And
so I find I must make some further assumptions before I can proceed.
Much will depend on the nature of the legislature in question, and whether
the supposed "invidious discrimination" relates to one or both houses. Repre-
sentativeness is a function of the total legislature, not just one house. Bicameral
representation theory cannot be understood or judged by looking at one house
alone, any more than a marriage can be judged by confining attention
to one spouse at a time. Also, because the constitution does not require mathe-
matical exactness, some inexactness regarding one house may be permissible if
counterbalanced by a higher degree of exactness in the other. With gross
numerical inexactness in both houses, as was the case in Tennessee, the entire
system may be constitutionally suspect. Also, beyond the question of numerical
inexactness, if a system operates to deny to a sizable numerical majority effective
control in both houses, the system would seem to be unreasonable per se, under
the due process clause.119
By contrast, if a system rests on a relatively strict population formula for
neither house, but at the same time does not depart very far from numerical
equality for either house, it may be deemed reasonable. This, to me, is the
New York case, and I approve it."'
As another alternative, if one house is composed more or less on a popula-
tion basis, and the other house represents political subdivisions, the legislature
is at worst only half unconstitutional, and perhaps not unconstitutional at all.
This is the Michigan case, 21 and for the time being I would prefer the view
that such a combination is constitutionally valid, whether or not politically wise.
118 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
119 Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 329, 362-63, 381-83; Neal, supra note 101, at 275, 285. See the Solicitor General's
review of due process precedents culminating in the statement: "When a State arbitrarily and
unreasonably apportions the legislature so as to deny the real meaning of the right to vote,
i.e., effective participation in democratic government, both the equal protection and due
process clauses are violated." Brief for U.S. on Rearg., p. 25, Baker v. Carr.
And see especially Justice Harlan's perceptive discussion of "equal protection" as con-
trasted with "due process" which he began in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29, 34-36
(1956), and continues in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963).
120 W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
121 Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962).
APPORTIONMENT STANDARDS AND JUDICIAL POWER
My reasons for withholding the ban of unconstitutionality from this so-
called "federal plan" of population representation in one house and political
subdivision representation in the other, are not based on any analogy to the
national government and the federal senate. They are based on an independent
analysis of representation theory, and may be outlined as follows. Group repre-
sentation means little if it is not effective representation. The way to achieve
effective representation of population minorities who nevertheless have an
identifiable interest, e.g., agriculture, is not by going all the way to straight
minority government as in Tennessee. The solution is to use the bicameral
system to give functional or area or political unit minorities a special voice in
one house. Indeed, representation of each county in the legislature may be a
practical necessity in those states such as Florida 22 and Maryland 23 where there
is a custom of handling local governmental matters by "special" legislation
(more properly called public-local legislation) rather than by public-general
legislation or county home rule.
Fears that this may operate to create an impassable veto are exaggerated.
Insofar as the veto possibility exists at all, it often can be effectively countered
by counterveto and counterpressure from the other house and from the governor
- both based on numerical majorities."2 4 Have we forgotten that "compro-
mise" is the key word in the whole lexicon of democracy? With this analysis
in mind, the outer boundary of any judicial activism should be to tinker one
house into a "numerical majority" framework - and this only as a rare judicial
act. To go further, without more evidence than we now have that more is
needed, would be a gross judicial usurpation. It would be to make of our
judges a new priesthood of democratic orthodoxy.
Given these assumptions regarding the constitutional base lines from which
courts should proceed, at least until we have made a fresh analysis of democratic
representation theory, the question of remedies can now be approached in con-
text, rather than in the abstract.
1. Declaration of Invalidity, Retention of Jurisdiction
Declarations of invalidity, retention of jurisdiction, and express or implied
deadlines for judicial reconsideration unless the legislature acts, should be the
first reliance, and hopefully the sole reliance, in most cases. Such action would
be in the Steel Seizure Case tradition of judicial faith in legislative good faith.
There are a number of examples of use of this technique in the short period
122 Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316, 322 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
123 BELL, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN MARYLAND (1958).
124 Do we yet have evidence that such a "rationalized" bicameralism, unlike the "irrational"
bicameralism of the Tennessee legislature before Baker v. Carr, will not work? Few studies
illuminate this question. For references see Hagan, The Bicameral Principle in State Legisla-
tures, 11 J. OF PuB. LAw 310 (1963), and references cited therein. After comparison of
unicameralism and bicameralism, Professor Hagan concludes: "To anyone who has examined
the justifications for change either way and compared them with the operating practices of
existing legislative bodies, the justifications have little basis in substance or experience. It is
also clear that there is a faith in the desirability of the bicameral legislature that transcends
evidence of the kind that has been surveyed here." Id. at 327.
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since Baker v. Carr.2 ' In some states the legislature has already acted, in some
the judicial deadline has not expired, and in some an appeal is pending."' 8
2. Injunctions Against Existing Statutes
Added pressure is produced if the further use of existing apportionment
formulae is forthwith enjoined. This tactic has all the merits, and defects, of
a shotgun wedding. Appropriateness of this action depends on the nearness of
the next election. Because state legislative apportionment is far more compli-
cated than congressional districting-which few courts seem to realize- an
injunction is inadvisable on the eve of an election. On this issue, precedents
since Baker go both ways.12
An added refinement would be to provide that the existing legislature
should serve until their successors shall be elected under a revised apportion-
ment formula. This added feature would avoid uftcertainties of an interregnum,
without materially reducing the pressure, because public opinion would not
view kindly any prolonged extension of terms of office without a renewed popular
mandate from the ballot box.
3. Judicial Choice of Plans Submitted by the Legislature
A third device, of limited utility because it rests on special circumstances,
is for the court to construct an apportionment formula by using pieces of dif-
ferent plans enacted by the legislature. This is the Alabama case." 8 As worked
out by the federal district court in that state, the order was more a King Solomon
type judgment than an emanation from any clearly articulated theory of federal
right.
125 E.g., Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d
656 (1962); Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Thigpen v. Meyers, 211 F.
Supp. 826 (W.D. Wash. 1962). On remedies generally see Merrill, Blazes for a Trail Through
the Thicket of Reapportionment, 16 OKLA. L. REV. 59 (1963).
126 See excellent state-by-state summary, 21 CONG. QUART. WEEKLY REP. 424-31 (1963).
(Ohio "federal plan" was just approved, Nolan v. Rhodes, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2641.)
127 In Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), the Michigan Supreme
Court nullified the senate apportionment formula and ordered an election at large, which
Justice Stewart then stayed at a special hearing during his summer vacation, 20 CONG. QUART.
WEEKLY REP. 1302 (1962).
But the more common approach is to deny an immediate injunction even if the existing
apportionment formulae are invalidated or seriously questioned. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 206
F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962);
Thigpen v. Meyers, 211 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Wash. 1962); Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296
(R.I. 1962). But see Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va.), stayed by Chief Justice
Warren on December 15, 1962, and motion to vacate stay denied, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3298
(U.S. March 18, 1963), prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963)
(No. 797).
See also Butcher v. Trimarchi, Dauphin County Commonwealth Court (Pa.); 20 CONG.
QUART. WEEKLY REP. 1071 (1962); reported in full in 1 NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,
COURT DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT (1962). The court did not enjoin, or
even reach the merits, because election was near, but hinted strongly that the existing apportion-
ment was constitutionally defective and that the legislature should take some action. The
court said: "The Legislature is now informed, as it has not been heretofore, that constitutional
apportionment is a matter that can be adjudicated if the Legislature fails to do so."
128 Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D.Ala. 1962), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Reynolds
v. Sims, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 508); also, Vann v. Fink, prob.
juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 540); also McConnell v. Frink,
prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 610).
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4. Specific Directions to the Legislature
Courts have split sharply on the question whether a declaration of invalidity,
if made, should be accompanied by specific directions to the legislature. At
least one state court, Vermont,"9 has expressed a feeling that detailed directions
would be inappropriate. Several other courts have simply nullified apportion-
ments and retained jurisdiction without discussing the appropriateness of ad-
vising the legislature.' 0 But in several states the federal or state courts have
given detailed guidelines. This last category includes federal courts in Dela-
ware,"3 1 Georgia," 2 Oklahoma. 3 and Tennessee,' and state courts in Michi-
gan,' Mississippi,3 6 and Rhode Island." 7 Limitations of space preclude an
individual analysis of these cases, but it can be safely stated that here, as in
the Alabama federal court's marriage of two legislative plans, 3s no clear theory
of the dimensions of the federal constitutional right has emerged. However,
only one court (Oklahoma) favored a "general principle of substantial numerical
equality"'' 3  for both houses; another (Michigan - senate only) would use
population as the basis but allow deviations up to 100 per cent, i.e., 2-1 dis-
parity; 40 a third (Delaware) would permit differential treatment of the
two houses - straight population in one house, heaviest weight to population
in other house but some weight to other factors; and the remaining four (Georgia,
Tennessee, Mississippi, Rhode Island) would approve a straight or modified
"federal plan," i.e., a relatively strict population basis for one house and political
subdivision representation in the other.
129 Mikell v. Rousseau, 183 A.2d 817 (Vt. 1962). The court also slapped the wrist of one
of the nominal defendants, a county clerk, who had joined the plaintiffs' cause and moved for
reargument on a technical point: "This is not a time for ingenuity; it is a time to be fair."
Id. at 823. See discussion of the "adversity" problem in apportionment cases in text accom-
panying notes 34-39 supra.
The Solicitor General seems to share this view, because in the Georgia county unit case
he recommended deletion of the district court's advisory provisions concerning permissibility
of population disparities not in excess of those found in the electoral college system of electing
a President and Vice President, saying: "to adjudicate the constitutionality of a specific plan
that the legislature has not adopted would seem to run the risk of interference in the political
process and to have many of the dangers of an advisory opinion." Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae, p. 62, Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
130 See Maryland and Washington cases cited supra note 125 and Pennsylvania case cited
supra note 127. See also League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189
(D. Neb. 1962); Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962), where the court said,
at 584: "While predominant, population is not in our opinion the sole or definitive measure
of districts when taken by the Equal Protection Clause." Cf. Lein v. Sathre, 205 F. Supp. 536
(D.N.D. 1962).
131 Sincock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1963). The court directed the "one
man-one vote" principle for the lower house, and said that in the senate apportionment
formula population should have the "heaviest weight," with "some weight" to other factors.
132 Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
133 Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962).
134 Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
135 Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962).
136 Fortner v. Barnett, 20 CONG. QUART. WEEKLY REP. 1071 (Ch. Ct., 1st Judic. Dist.
Miss. 1962), reported in full in 1 NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT DECISIONS ON
LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT (1962).
137 Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962).
138 Sims v. Frink, 207 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
139 Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885, 898 (W.D. Okla. 1962).
140 Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962). The less-than-lucid opinion
of the court can be interpreted as resting the 2-1 ratio on a state law ground, after first holding
the then existing formula invalid under the fourteenth amendment.
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Detailed prescriptions for apportionment are not the business of the judi-
ciary, even in states where advisory opinions are permitted. An advisory opinion
is still a legal opinion, not a political act. But it follows from what I have said
earlier that if adjudication of malapportionment is essential in some states to
restore the rudiments of government by consent, then some minimal guidance
to the legislature is unavoidable in the process of honestly trying to articulate
the basis for declaring an existing apportionment system unconstitutional. In
this category would fall such pronouncements as the statement that if one house
is placed on an arithmetic equality basis the other house may represent political
subdivisions - at least for the time being. But the freewheeling "advisory
order" of the federal district court in Oklahoma does seem to exceed permissible
bounds.14'
5. Partial Judicial Apportionment To Break the "Strangle Hold"
Justice Clark suggested this device, as a temporary measure, in his con-
currence in Baker v. Carr. '4 This is a last resort measure. It would at least
be better by far than either of two other extreme measures suggested - election
at large, or weighted voting. If done, perhaps with the aid of a master, it should
be confined to one house and consist essentially of adding a "pack" of seats to
existing districts to reduce the population disparity to something like the 2-1
ratio suggested by the Michigan Supreme Court. But the ratio picked is sec-
ondary; the primary rationalizing principle is to restore a popular majority
to control of at least one house.
6. Election at Large
Those who champion elections at large of state legislatures have not thought
through the problem of representative government. To shift to elections at
large is to abandon any pretence of representation, at least where state legisla-
tures are concerned. It would be tossing the representation baby out with the
equal protection bath. Every legislator would have the same constituency as
the governor, and a single large city, if there were one, could dominate. To
counter by saying that it is only intended as a sanction, and would not really
need to be carried through, is judicial blackmail with a vengeance, and beneath
the level of serious discussion.
Explicit rejections of the election at large proposal have occurred in at
least a half dozen states.143 Only in Kansas (in a lower state court)..4 and
141 Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962). The court, inter alia, removed
the constitutional ceiling of seven per county on lower house membership, and said Oklahoma
and Tulsa counties would be entitled to 19 and 15 house seats respectively. But, without
explaining why, it indicated it should respect the state constitution's limit on the size of the
senate. See appendix re USDC order of 7/17/63, directly reapportioning Okla. legislature.
142 369 U.S. 186, 260 (1962).
143 A Mississippi court characterized the matter this way: "This Court would not consider
a reapportionment which would require our senators and representatives to be elected by the
.State at large. Such a reapportionment would only cause chaos and confusion. It would defeat
the very object of this suit and benefit no one. In fact, when we think of the chaos and
confusion, we throw up our hands in utter despair." Fortner v. Barnett, (Miss. 1962), reported
in 1 NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT DECISIONS ON REAPPORTIONMENT.
See also In re Legislative Apportionment, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1962); Opinion to the
Governor, 185 A.2d 111 (R.I. 1962); State v. Gage, 377 P.2d 299 (Wyo. 1963); League
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Michigan 4" has it received serious consideration, and in the latter state the
state Supreme Court may well have had its benevolent eye on Detroit. An
election at large could even be adverse to the interest of an underrepresented
urban section of the state if that section were not large or influential enough to
control the election. The attorneys for the northern Virginia plaintiffs in the
Virginia legislature case, now at the United States Supreme Court, backed away
from election at large in their amended pleading. They feared the possibility
that in an at large election northern Virginia would have not merely inadequate
representation but no representation. 4 '
Use of elections at large as a remedial device for state legislative mal-
apportionment must be sharply distinguished from use of this device as a remedy
for unequal congressional districts. Election at large of a state's congressional
delegation is not nearly so objectionable, is authorized by Congress,"' and has
occurred in the past. 4 An important representation function would remain,
for each state would be represented in Congress through its entire delegation.
The more appropriate analogy at the national level, of electing a state legisla-
ture at large, would be to elect all congressmen at large in the nation, and not
by states.
6. Weighted Voting
Although mentioned in passing in the opinion of the Maryland Court of
Appeals, 4 ' the device of weighted voting, whereby a legislator casts a vote in
proportion to the size of his constituency, will have more appeal to mathema-
ticians and manufacturers of computers than to serious students of politics.
Other courts which have discussed it have rejected it. 5 '
of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189 (D. Neb. 1962); Brown v. State
Election Board, 369 P.2d 140 (Okla. 1962); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885, 891-92
(W.D. Okla. 1962).
144 Harris v. Shanahan, 20 CONG. QUART. WEELY REP. 1306 (Dist. Ct. of Shawnee
County, Kansas, July 26, 1962), reported in full in 2 NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT
DECISIONS ON LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT (1962).
145 Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962).
146 Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962). See Complaint, Plaintiffs' Trial
Brief, pp. 2, 19, and letter to author from E. A. Prichard, Fairfax, Virginia (Plaintiffs'
counsel, with Edmund D. Campbell, Washington, D.C.), March 6, 1963.
147 2 U.S.C. § 2(c) (5) (1958): "Until a State is redistricted ... (5) if there is a decrease
in the number of Representatives and the number of districts in such State exceeds such
decreased number of Representatives, they shall be elected from the State at large."
148 E.g., Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S.
355 (1932). See discussion of these and other cases in Dixon, Legislativ.e Apportionment and
the Federal Constitution, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 330, 340-47 (1962); Lewis, Legislative
Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1087-90 (1958).
Regarding the post-Baker congressional district suits see note 24 supra.
149 Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656
(1962).
150 Fortner v. Barnett (Miss. 1962), reported in 1 NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COURT
DECISIONS ON REAPPORTIONMENT; Brown v. State Election Board, 369 P.2d 140 (Okla. 1962).
One of the plaintiffs' attorneys in the Alabama litigation now before the Supreme Court,
Vann v. Frink, prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 540),
has assessed weighted or fractional voting as follows:
We treated this remedy as another theoretical remedy because of the cumber-
some nature of counting votes and the impossibility of producing effective
committee participation for large counties on this basis. We also felt that it
would be impractical to apply with respect to such parliamentary devices as
extended debate, voice votes, and quorum calls.
Letter to author from David J. Vann, Birmingham, Alabama, Jan. 29, 1963.
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7. Federal Enforcement of State Constitutional Formulae
At an early stage of the Baker v. Carr litigation, plaintiffs' counsel suggested,
as a joint solution both for the standard and for the remedy problem, that the
federal court simply enforce the long-ignored apportionment provisions of Ten-
nessee's state constitution.' 5 ' Dean Neal has ably discussed this idea and con-
cluded that despite some logical appeal as an abstract proposition, the implica-
tions are too far-reaching to permit its serious consideration;15 I agree. To
derive from the equal protection clause a federal body of remedial law to redress
state official departure from pre-existing state norms would be a far-reaching
change in federal-state relations. It would go far toward substituting federal
for state courts in application of state law to official indiscretions. 5 '
Chief Judge Brune of the Maryland Court of Appeals, dissenting in the
Maryland senate case, did seem to make this suggestion but on closer inspection
it is seen that he was talking about something different. 5 He was assuming
that an independent federal standard is to be applied to a state's actual
practice whether or not in accord with the state constitution. He then
suggests, but only at the level of remedy, that the apportionment formula in
the state constitution be looked to as possibly embodying a state political choice
already made, and which, if implemented, might fall within the federal standard.
As he puts it: "Where compliance with State constitutional requirements will
also vindicate the federal right shown to have been infringed, a decree in ac-
cordance with State constitutional provisions is an obviously desirable form of
remedy and the otherwise possibly very difficult problem of determining an
appropriate remedy (a problem not solved by Baker) may become relatively
simple."' 55
151 Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 3, 9, 12-13, 14-16, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See also Brief for Appellants, pp. 4, 23-26, 28.
152 Neal, supra note 101, at 291-300.
153 See Frankfurter, J., dissenting, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 242 (1961): inveighing
against fourteenth amendment interpretations which would bring the federal government into
the business of overseeing "the quotidian business" of "every city inspector or investigator...
in this country."
154 Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 229 Md. 406, 184 A.2d 715
(1962), prob. juris. noted, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 554).
155 Id. at 722.
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CONCLUSION
Proverbially, hard cases make bad law. Some cases are so hard they may
make no "law" at all. Reapportionment may be an example. Representation,
apportionment and districting go to the heart of democracy. They determine
the structure of the democratic state. Structure conditions the process of politics
which in turn determines the outcome of specific policy issues. On such matters
as these there may be informed commentators but there are no experts, certainly
no neutral experts.
In assessing the role of the courts, the large problem that remains and
which will be with us for a long time is the problem of articulating constitutional
standards, not the problem of shaping remedies. As a guide to meaningful stand-
ards which will be politically realistic, will minimize federal interference, and
will allow some play in the joints and some state diversification in representation
systems tailored to local conditions, the equal protection clause is woefully
inappropriate. We must come to recognize, despite the trend of litigation in
the past few months, that representation is sui generis so far as equal protection
is concerned, and is not uniquely an equal protection issue.
The due process and republican form of government clauses are more
appropriate conduits for apportionment litigation, not because they make the
cases easier to solve but because they better lend themselves to analysis in terms
of the central purposes of a system of representative government, and the per-
missible range of alternative means which will be reasonably consistent with
these purposes. By their very indefiniteness they put the real questions, rather
than conceal them. Courts must ever remember that the "political thicket'.' is
not their natural habitat, and that it is no less political because the courts are
in it. Rejuvenation of the political system, not direction of it, must be the aim.
A representation system under which a popular majority is excluded from
effective voice in both houses is unreasonable because minority process is not
due process. But to insist on "rational plans" of apportionment, or on arithmetic
equality, without recognizing the inherent political choices, is to submerge
substance in form. Justice should be blind, but not naive.
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FORMAL APPORTIONMENT FORMULAE OF STATE LEGISLATURES AS OF APRIL 1, 1963
Political Subdivision or Mixed Population-Geographic Principle
Basis of Representation Upper House Lower House
I. Representation Based On Geographic
Unit Without Regard To Population:
(a) Equal Representation For Each
County.
(b) Equal Representation Based On
Geographic Units Other Than
Counties (including districts ini-
tially devised according to pop-
ulation but fixed in constitution,
e.g., Ark., N. D., Okla.).
II. Representation Based On Geographic
Unit With MINOR Modifications Based
On Population.a
III. Representation Proportioned To Units
(county or district) On Basis Of Pop-
ulation but with MAJOR limitations to
achieve geographic diffusion which may
substantially defeat population principle:
e.g., (1) Minimum limits, e.g., rule that
no unit may have less than one repre-
sentative, and/or, limitation on number
of units which may be combined to
approximate one quota; (2) Maximum
limits, e.g., rule that no unit may have
more than a designated number of
representatives; and (3) Low limit (in
relation to number of counties) on
maximum size of legislature when com-
bined with minimum diffusion rules.a
TOTALS
Arizona
Idaho
Montana
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
South Carolina
(7)
Arkansas
Delaware
Illinois
North Dakota
Oklahoma
(5)
Hawaii
Maryland
Ohio
(3)
Alabama
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Iowa
Louisiana
Maine
Michigan
Mississippi
Nebraska
Rhode Island
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Wyoming
(16)
31
Delaware Vermont
(2)
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
35
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Texas
Utah
West Virginia
Wyoming
(33)
a Some states may be classified to either II or III, depending on the weight given to special
constitutional provisos. The distinction may not be vital however, because the primary thrust
of both II and III is toward geographic diffusion or political subdivision representation, not
representation by an equal population principle.
b Some states charted in this category have special formulae not easily classifiable but
weighted more to population principle than to geographic diffusion.
c Despite constitutional provisions apparently specifying apportionment by population,
all states in categories IV and V had population disparities between largest and smallest
district at least exceeding 25% on the eve of Baker v. Carr, and in most instances far exceeding
that figure.
Sources: State Constitutions; NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUM ON LEGISLATIVE
APPORTIONMENT (Boyd ed., 1962); correspondence with state officials. See also THE BOOK OF
THE STATES (1962-63).
Comment: This chart initially appeared in Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the
Federal Constitution, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 329, 387 (1962), and has been updated
and rearranged. Despite much judicial and legislative activity, and heightened recognition of
the population principle, few states have changed their basic apportionment formulae sufficiently
to change their position on this chart. States may increase the weight of the population principle
considerably and still remain in Chart Category III if major geographic diffusion provisos are
retained. The most difficult allocation is between Chart Categories III and IV, but, unless
attempted, generalizations become oversimplified. States changing position on this revised Chart
are: Colorado, senate, from V to III; Georgia, senate, from III to V; Michigan, senate,
from I(b) to III; Mississippi, senate, from II to III; Nebraska, unicameral, from V to III.
See Appendix for special state comments.
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FORMAL APPORTIONMENT FORMULAE OF STATE LEGISLATURES AS OF APRIL 1, 1963
Population Principle, Substantially Unqualified
Basis of Representation Upper House Lower House
IV. Representation To Be Alaska Oregon Alaska Oregon
Apportioned On Missouri Pennsylvania New Hampshire South Dakota
Population Basis New Hampshire South Dakota (Tax basis; ap- (4)
With Apparently NewYork (7) pears to avoid
MINOR Limita- gross inequity.)
tions.b, e
V. Populatio~c Georgia Tennessee Colorado Minnesota
Indiana Virginia Illinois Tennessee
Kansas Washington Indiana Virginia
Kentucky West Virginia Kentucky Washington
Massachusetts Wisconsin Massachusetts Wisconsin
Minnesota (12) Michigan (11)
North Carolina
TOTALS 19 15
APPENDIX TO CHART ON FORMAL APPORTIONMENT FORMULAE
OF STATE LEGISLATURES
Recent developments in the following states merit special comment. In addition to the
sources listed on the chart, see also the summation in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report for March 22, 1963, pages 424-31.
Alabama
A federal district court decreed reapportionment of both houses, combining parts of two
measures passed by the legislature. Guarantee of one representative per county was retained
for lower house, and political subdivisions continue to play a major role in senate apportion-
ment. Both houses remain in Category III despite heightened representation of population.
See Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Reynolds
v. Sims, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3404 (U.S. June 10, 1963) (No. 508).
Colorado
The voters approved a "federal" plan initiative measure November 6, 1962. The lower
house stays in Category V. The senate formula moves from Category V to Category III.
Florida
A 1963 session of the legislature reapportioned both houses of the legislature but retained
a guarantee of one representative per county for the lower house, and weighted counties heavily
in the senate. Both houses remain in Category III. The action was impelled by litigation.
Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
Georgia
A special legislative session in October 1962 reapportioned the senate on a population
basis. The senate moves from Category III to Category V. The action was impelled by a
federal court order specifying a population basis for at least one house. Toombs v. Fortson,
205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
Kentucky
Already classifiable to Category V according to its formal apportionment formula, al-
though not fully honored in practice, Kentucky moved closer to compliance with the
population principle through action in the 1963 legislative session.
Idaho
In response to a message from Governor Smylie the 1963 session of the legislature re-
apportioned the lower house but retained guarantee of at least one representative per county.
Lower house remains in Category III. An earlier state case had been dismissed, Caesar v.
Williams, 371 P.2d 241 (Idaho 1962), but a federal court case was pending, Hearne v. Smylie,
D. Idaho, filed Oct. 31, 1962.
Iowa
A proposed constitutional amendment to be submitted to a special referendum election,
December 3, 1963, would place the lower house on a political subdivision basis with one
representative for each county, and the senate on a population basis with a maximum allowable
deviation of 10%.
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Maryland
A special legislative session in May 1962 added 19 lower house seats for urban areas,
but retained minimum guarantee of two delegates per county. Lower house remains in Category
III, although now more heavily weighted toward population. The session was impelled by
court action, Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d
656 (1962).
Michigan
The new Michigan Constitution ratified in April 1963 creates a senate apportionment
formula keyed 80% to population and 20% to land area. The senate therefore moves from
Category I(b) to Category III. A 20% area factor seems to modify the population principle
too much to justify an allocation to Category IV.
Mississippi
A constitutional amendment approved in February 1963 allocates one house seat to each
of 82 counties and distributes another 40 seats according to population. This new house
formula apparently remains in Category III, despite the enhancement of population. The new
senate apportionment gives each of 22 populous counties one seat and combines the smaller
counties into 30 additional senatorial districts. This new senate formula seems to warrant a
chart shift from Category II to Category III, although there is less population emphasis than
in some other states classified to this category.
Nebraska
By a constitutional amendment ratified November 6, 1962, Nebraska modified her popula-
tion principle for apportionment by providing that henceforth area should be weighted a
minimum of 20% and a maximum of 30%. Nebraska's unicameral legislature thus moves
from Category V to Category III.
North Carolina
Without being impelled by court action the voters ratified a constitutional amendment
in November 1962 providing for automatic reapportionment of the lower house every ten years
under a formula guaranteeing each of 100 counties one representative regardless of population
and allocating an additional twenty seats by population. Lower house remains in Category III.
Oklahoma
Under pressure of a federal court order the 1963 legislative session reapportioned both
houses. However, on July 17, 1963, the federal district court rejected this apportionment
plan and itself apportioned both houses on a population basis, the first post-Baker court to
take such action. Oklahoma City Times, July 17, 1963, p. 6, cols. 1-4. This decree would move
both houses to Category V on the chart.
Oregon
The voters rejected an initiative measure, November 6, 1962, which would have added
area to the apportionment formula for the lower house. Both houses stay in Category IV.
Tennessee
The Tennessee state constitution of 1901, although not honored in practice, specifies a
population formula for both houses. After the Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Carr
a special legislative session enacted an apportionment measure'moving a little nearer the
population principle. See Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). But simulta-
neously the legislature placed on the November 6, 1962 general election ballot a .proposal
for a 1965 constitutional convention which is expected to recommend a "federal plan" to
replace the present population formulae. The voters approved the call of a convention for
this purpose, delegates to be chosen on same basis as present legislature.
Utah
The 1963 legislative session increased urban representation in both houses but both houses
apparently continue in Category III according to present information. Each county is guaranteed
at least one lower house seat.
Vermont
A special legislative session in August 1962 switched two senate seats without changing
guarantee of a minimum of one senator per county. Senate stays in Category III. The session
was impelled by a suit in which the court had admonished the legislature to do its duty, and
had retained jurisdiction. Mikell v. Rousseau, 183 A.2d 817 (Vt. 1962). The session also
created an apportionment study commission.
